Fault tree malysis is now commonly used to ;issess the adequacy, in reliability terms, of inclustri:tl systems. For complex systems ;in m;ilysis may produce thousands of combinations of events which c;in c;iuse system failure (minimal cut sets). The deterinination of these minimal cut sets c m be a very time consuming ,process even on inodeni high speed digital computers. Also it the fault tree h:is inmy minimal cut sets calculating the exact top event prob:ibility will require extensive calcul;ilions. For many complex fault trees this requirement is beyond the capability of Lhe iivailaible machines, thus appro xi in a t i on t ec hi1 i y u es nee cl to be introduced resulting in loss of accuracy.
INTRODUCTION
The fault tree diagram itself is an excellcilt way of deriving the failure logic for ;i system auld representing it in ;I form which is ideal for communic~itioIi to other managers/ clesigners/operiitors etc. The f;iult tree is discussed in cletail iii Andrews and Moss (Ref. 1) . Since the method was first conceived in the early sixties, algorithms to dcrive the minimal cut sets have worked directly with the fault tree diagram itself using either bottom-up, Seinanderes (Ref. 2) . or top-down, Fussell and Vesely (Ref. 3) , appro:ichcs. C'ompulerised methods to conduct this :ui;tlysis w e iiow so well clevelopecl that further refinement is unlikely to resul~ in v x t rcductions in computer time. Tackling this problem to impi-ove computational efficiency has heell the miiiii conceni over the yews for many fault tree rese:uchers, Bennetts (Ref. 4) and Bengiamiii et al. (Ref. 5 ) hnve both aclclre I~Jsu a1 1 y by modify i 11 g t h e est ab 1 i sh ecl , con ve 11 ti on a 1 approaiclies such :is MOCT JS (Ref. 3) .
It is felt that substmtial improvement in computer utilisation will only result from ;I completely new :ippro:ich. Such :in approach would involve spccifyiilg the logic cyu:ilion in ;I form which is easier to 1nanipu1;ite th;tn ;I tau11 wee. A recent p:tper by Riuzy (Ret. 6) tias iiiclicatecl that ;in nllcm;itive approach h t e r :md P( Top) C i using a Binary Decision Diagram may provide a more efticient means of aindysing tault trees.
NOTATION
-Probability ot Top Even1 o f ;i hult tree.
-Minirnal ('ut Set.
PRE (Top)
-R:re Event Approximation of Top Event Prohability.
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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The analysis of the fault tree is generally unclert:ken in two stages: qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Qualitative nnalysis involves obtaining the various combinations of events which c;iuse system ftiilure (minimal cut sets) and yu;uitificatioii then cleats with calculating the probability or freyuency that system failure will occur.
The conventional :ipproach to obtain the minimal cut sets is to take the Boolean logic expression for the Top Event and transform it into ;i sum of products (s.0.p) form. (.)ne way of doing this is to use ;I Bottom-'I Jp procedure such ;is that of Sem:inderes (Ref. 2) . To obtain the w . p form for the Top Event of the f:tult tree, the inputs to the lowest gates ;re 0-7803-3112-5/96/$5.00 0 1996 IEEE 1996 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium represented ais logic equations. Once the lowcr gates have %e11 expressed in this way highei-gates :U-e then treated sirnil:u-ly. The final s.0.p fonn should be in term of basic events only.
If the fault tree contains repeated events then the resulting s.0.p will not be m i n i n~l and tlie minimal cut sets c;ui not be directly obtained. If this is the case Boo1e;iu Recluction R I~!~ must first be applied to the s.0.p form to obtain the minirnal cut sets. The task of obtaining the minimal cut sets of ;i ftiult tree can become computationally intensive. if the logic equations produce many cut sets, due to the number of compzu-isons that 2u. e needed to make the expression minirnal. Also the expansion procedure c;ui rnake extensive dernands on memory space.
To overcome these problems various techniques h w e been employed to reduce the uurnber of compnrisons (Ref. 7). Some methods only produce the most important minirnal cut sets. (hie of these techniques is refeired to ;is culling, which means that cut sets of a certain order, s:iy 4 and above, ;re ignored or deleted from the expression, Rasmuson and Marshall (Ref. X) employ this technique in their paper. The .i ustificntion for doing this is that cut sets of ;I high order tend t o have ; I low probability of occurrence ancl therefore do not 1nake ;I significmt contribution to the Top Event prolxibility. However the dis;idvantage of this is that when coininon cause failures :re involved this method results in consider;ible inaccuracies. Probabilistic culling GLII also be applied, in this c x e ;i cut set whose probability of occuirence is below some thresholcl limit will ag:un be ignored.
Qurr n tit( i tivc An (I 1y.v is
The convenlional ;ipproach (see Henley and Kurn:unoto in Ref. 9) to obtain the exact probability o f the 'Top Evcnt is to use the formula:
Where ci, i=l, .....,.... uc we the minini~il cut sets of the Top Event, i.e. product term.
Clearly if the fiiult bee has many minirnal cut sets calculating P(Top) will require extensive calcu1:itions to evaluate each term in the expression, for rnaiiy complex fault trees the requirement is beyond the capability of the available machines. To simplify the calculation the Rare Eveut Approximation, P R~ I TO^), c m he used which is:
111'
(2) i=l However a more ;iccut';ite approxi~nation is the Mininixl (:ut Set T Jpper Bound, P M~-,~~~( T O~) , which is:
BINARY IIECISION DIAGRAM MElHOII
The Binary Decision Diognun (BL>I>) method, developed by Rauzy (Ref. (71,  first convei-ts the fault tree to ;I binary decision diagram which encodes ;in If-Then-Else (ire) structure. The attractive thing :&out the BIN> method is that the ite structure derives from Shannons' formula (Ref. lo), such that if f(x) is the Boolean Function for the top event of a lault tree theu the Shannon formula c m he written its:
and the corresponding ite structure is ite(X1, f l , f2), for ; I detailed account of this procedure refer to Ref. 11 and Ref. 12. From this diagram both the qualitative x i c l quantitative analysis can be achievecl.
The size of the resultkg BDD is cleterminecl by the ordering that has to be given to the basic events in the fault tree before the BDD is constructecl. This ordering has further implications for the analysis. If the BDD is not in ;I minimal fonn, then the BDD must first undergo ;I rniniinising algorithm before the minimal cut sets c:ui he obtained, this minimising technique is discussed in section 6. The quantitative analysis must be performed 011 the unminirnised diagram. The reason being that the minimising procedure produces ;i new BDD which only encodes the minimal cut sets. However if the ordering of the basic events produces ;I minimal BDI> then both the yunntitutive and qualitative analysis is straight forw:ud. It is therefore beneficial t o achieve x i ordering which is optimal in terms of the resulting size of the BI>I>. The ordering of basic events to produce ;i minimal diagram is consiclered in (Ref. 11) :ind discussed in section 7.
To illustrate the method of obtaining the miniinad cut sets and probability of occuirence o f tlie top event using the BI)I) method refer to the example fault tree 111 tiguic 1. Assume xi ordering for the basic events which is derived by considering those events at higher levels in the tree structure first:
To obtain the ire structures for each gate in the f:iult tree the following procedures are usccl:
(1) Taking X<Y; Let J=ite(X, F1, F2) and II=ice(Y, (;I, (i2) then:
(2) Taking X=Y:
i.e., J=ite(X, F1, F2) :md II=ite(X, (;I, (;2) then:
where <op> corresponds to the Boolexi operation ot the logic gates in the fault tree. For :ui AND gate <op> will he the dot or product symbol aiid tor ;in OR gate <op> will hc the addition symbol.
Also it is eviclent that; 
)). tb
To oht:un the cut sets ~t the hult tree the pnths through the BDD :re traced from the top or root vertex to ;I terminal 1 vertex. Only the basic e v e m that lie oil ;I 1 hriuich (indicating the friilure of that basic event) on the way to ;I terminal 1 vertex are included in ;I path. Thereforr the p:iths through the BDD which correspond to the cut set\ of tlie lault tree :re: Therefore the BDT) calculations for the fault tree in iigure 1 are tlie following:
XI.X3
= ite(X2, 1, ite(X3, I, 0 ) ) = ite(X2, I, ite(X3, I , O)).ite(X3, 1, ite(X4, 1,O)).
Cllearly the resulting BDI) for this orclering is not minimum ;is it procluces one reclundant cut set. The minimising procedure for the BDI) which will produce the miiiimal Cut sets directly is discussed in section 6.
To obtxin the prohahility o f occurrence oi the top evellt ot the fault tree ( e,,,,,, ( 1 )
Xl.X2.X3 (2) Xl.X2.X1.X4
Xl.X2.X3
Before continuing with the calculation of Q,vy,s the basic emits iu the f d t tree ireecl to he assigned prohahilities, which for this example :re given in qi -I Jnavailability of compoiienr i. hi -Conditional failure intensity of coinpoileiit i.
wi -1 Jiicoiiditioiial failure intensity of component i.
Since e,(?,, c m be obtained from the probability of the sum of the dis.ioint paths through the BIII) then:
The algorithm used by R X~J for calculating the probability is given in Ref.
6.
For some systems it is Uie unreliability which IS required tor the top event i.e., the probability it will not work continuously over ;I given time period. An upper bound lor this is the Expected number of top event tccurrences W(0, t): e(l;, q ) -is die probability of system f%ilure with q i = 1.
e(oi,y) -is the probability of system failure with yi = 0 .
Evaluating each o f the two terms Q(l, , y) m c l Q(0, , y) to1 each cornponent coulcl be :ichievecl by tn\t \ub\titutiiig q, = 1 aiid then yi = 0, i.e., the probability that coinpoiieiii i ecluals 1 and 0 respectively, and re-running tlie system failure probability calculations. This would require the equivalent of 211 evalu:ttions of the top event probability to cleduce all terms required in the expression for I.v,~,,,~ in eq (X),
Coiisicler the vat-iable Xi which occurs at two nodes in tlie BDD ( Figure 3 where: (7) where Gi (y) is tile criticality tunction lor e:tc~i componeri( The criticality function Gi ( (1) is defined a s the prob;ibility that the system is in it critical state with respect to componeiit i and that the failure of coinpoileiit i will then cause the system to go from the working t o the f;ulecl state, i.e., the probability that the system fails only if component i liiils. Therefore:
Where; 1 1 7 -~~( q ) -is tlie probability of the path section from tlie 1-oot 1 p , . i ( q ) -is the probability of the path section from node to node xi. node xi to the terminal 1 nocle after the 1 branch from node xi. 0 poV, (y) -is Uie probability of the path sectioii from nocle xi to the termin:il I node after the 0 branch from node xi.
-is the probability of paths from the root node to the terminal 1 nodes which clo not go through ;i node for variable xi.
Z(q)

I1
-All Iiocles for variable xi on the BDD.
Therefore:
A more etficient way to calculate w,,, is to rnake one pass ot the BDD to calculate p~. ,~ 
Since we have calculated the criticality function for each component, w ,~~~~ c m now he evaluaietl using the trequency data from table 1 using eq (X).
1 Jsing eq (7) the expected nuinher of top event O C C U I T~I~C~~ hi tiuie, t, c;ui he obtauned.
MINIMISING THE RDl)
In the example fault tree ( figure 1 ) the resulting BDI) (figure 2) was not rniniinu~n as it procluced ; I redundant cut set. To obtain only minimal cut sets the BDD must first undergo ;I minimising procedure. From the unrninirnised BDD the minimising algorithm of Rauzy (Ref. 6) Tracing the paths through the minimised BDD we obtain the minimal cut sets:
(1) Xl.X2.X4
(2) x 1 .x3
VARIABLE ORDERING SCHEME
The ordering of basic events will cletermine the size of the resulting BDD. BI)IYs produced using ;t simplc "top-down" ordering of the v:u-i:tblcs are trequently inelficieiit since they produce it large iiurnber of non-minimal cut sets. An alternative ordering scheme is preseiited here which focuses on those basic events which are repeated in the 13tult tree structure. It is the repeattccl events which c;tusc the problem of non-minimal cut sets, and by considering these events first simplifies the resulting BDI) structure :tiid therefore inakes it more optimal. The alternative ordering scheme again considers the basic events in it top-down ordering (after the fault tree structure is contracted into a11 alteniating sequence o f AND and ()R gates). However a s each gale is considered the basic events which are inputs to the gatc are t;Lken in order of Uiosc which occur most frequently in the tault tree and placed in the ordering list. When gate input everits ;ue encountered which are already entered in the ordering list cluc to the occurrence at ;I higher level in the tree then they iire iyiored ~i d the rernauiiing input events are ordered.
Applying the new ordering heie to the examplc tault tree (figure 1) with repeated event X7, we get the orrlcring Xl<XkX2<X4. The resulliiig BDI) toi tiits allernalive ordering is miniiiiuin so the minimising technique is not needed, this is aclvantageous in terms ot reduced comput;ition t h e . Work cmied out to ditte inclicates tha( the new orrlering atppears to produce more optimal BDTI's comp;u-ecl to other orderings. Bryant (Ret. 13) recogiii\ed the prohlcin of computing iui ordering that iniiiutiises Uie size ot the Br)D md for some trees it may not be possiblc lo pioduce ;i miiiim;il BDD whatever the ordering.
Further improvements in terms oi coinputational efficiency ciui he made for the more complex fiiult trees by modukrisiiig the fault tree hefore the milysis takes place. Kliocla et al. (Ref. 14) define it module of ;I fiiult tree ~L Y Iiaving no inputs which appear elsewhere in the tree and iio outputs to the rest of the tree except from its output event. For example consider the fmlt tree in figure 0. Modules wliicli have the properties defined above ru-e gates (i2, ( 3 iuicl Top.
Q
G1
x Q The modularised fault tree is shown in figure 10 . By then using the BDD method to mtlyse this tree in terins of the moduks and then each module in tuiii the results cxi he combined to provide iui efficient means ot ;uialysing the whole fialt tree.
CONCLUSION
('onventional top-down m c l bottom-up techniques c;ui lead to many redundant cut sets ancl calculating exact top event probability can become impossible. To uiiprove these aitalysis procedures the aim has been to represent the system fiiilure logic in a mode which lends itsell to the mathernatical oiaiiipulnt ion.
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Representing the Boolean failure logic eciu:itioii in the form of a B1)I) provides an alternative techiiique which gives significant savings in the computational efficiency and lends itself to m;iiiipulation. Also the BDI) produces exact quantified results ancl top event parmeters such as failure probability and tlie system unconditional frulure intensity and the expected number of occuixnces c m be obtained with e.:ise.
To simplify the analysis even further the liiult tree may be modularised prior to tlie aiialysis. An alleimitive ordering of the basic event variables has also shown itself to signillcantly improve efficiency .
The trade off for the advantages described is the effort taken to convert the logic from tlie fault tree structure to the BDL) form. However early work indicates that for large, complex trees this can produce ;I substantial recluction iii coniputational effort.
